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THE ELUSIVE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER AIR
TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND SOUTH KOREA
Dana L. Christensen
t
Abstract: Contrary to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, the federal courts should be
permitted to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the international transportation of
goods by air between South Korea and the United States. Applying general principles of
treaty interpretation under customary international law confirms that treaty relations
under the Warsaw Convention exist between the two countries by way of the United
States' adherence to that treaty, and South Korea's adherence to the Hague Protocol.
Since federal courts have jurisdiction over cases arising under U.S. treaties, the district
court was vested with treaty jurisdiction and the case should have been decided according
to the terms of the Warsaw Convention. Furthermore, even in the absence of actual
treaty relations, the question as to whether or not treaty relations existed was sufficient to
support federal question jurisdiction. As a result, the court had discretion to rule on
related claims, even after the dismissal of the treaty claim.
We are to find out the intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the
subject matter; and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and to stop
where that stops-whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves
behind.
U.S. Supreme Court in The Amiable Isabella'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines,2 a case concerning the
application of the Warsaw Convention 3 to international air transportation
between South Korea4 and the United States, the Court of Appeals for the
t B.S., Mechanical Engineering, Brigham Young University, 1989; MBA, University of
Washington School of Business, 2001; J.D., University of Washington School of Law, expected 2002.
Recipient, Perkins Coie Seattle Student Fellowship, 2000. Employed for ten years in aerospace
manufacturing industry by Allied Signal Aerospace and Boeing. The author would like to thank Professors
Peter Nicolas and Diane Atkinson-Sanford for their generous and patient guidance and for their valuable
insights.
In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821) (construing the treaty between the
United States and Spain of 1795).
2 Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 2000).
3 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (1994)
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. This treaty governs "international carriage of persons, luggage or goods
performed by aircraft for reward." Id. art. 1, para. 1. See discussion infra Part III.A.
. 4 The Republic of Korea is commonly known as South Korea. See BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND
PAC. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: KOREA, at http://www.state.gov/www/
background notes/southkorea_0006_bgn.html (Oct. 2000).
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Second Circuit held that because the two countries adhered to different
versions of the treaty they had no relevant treaty relationship and therefore,
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy.5
Specifically, the court of appeals held that because South Korea adhered
only to the Hague Protocol, an amending agreement, and the United States
adhered only to the original Warsaw Convention, treaty relations had not
been created between the two countries. This holding rendered the air
carrier liability limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention 7
inapplicable in the Chubb case.
The court of appeals' holding was unexpected in light of the fact that
other courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, had decided earlier cases on
the grounds that a Warsaw Convention treaty relationship existed between
the United States and South Korea. 8 Furthermore, the Second Circuit's
reasoning further deteriorates the Warsaw Convention's goal of uniformity
in international aviation law, as the parties to the Warsaw Convention and its
various amending agreements split into ever smaller factions by adhering to
different combinations of agreements. Moreover, the implications of the
Chubb holding reach far beyond the application of the Warsaw
Convention-potentially affecting the application of any multilateral treaty
that has been amended.
Because of the high probability of raising political issues, questions
regarding the jurisdiction of federal courts are particularly important in the
international context. Thus, the U.S. Constitution deliberately places
disputes regarding U.S. treaties and international law under the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 9 Notwithstanding this constitutional directive, and
contrary to existing precedent, the court of appeals found that a substantial,
nonfrivolous allegation of a claim under a valid U.S. treaty did not establish
federal question subject matter jurisdiction. This holding would discourage
plaintiffs from bringing legitimate claims based on U.S. treaties or
international law in a federal forum. As a result, plaintiffs will be induced to
bring cases that will determine the future boundaries of international law in
state court rather than in federal court.
s Chubb, 214 F.3d at 314.6 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter
Hague Protocol]. See discussion infra Part III.B.
In most cases of passenger injury or death, or damage to or loss of cargo, the Warsaw Convention
limits the air carriers' liability for accidental injury or death, and damaged or lost baggage or cargo.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 17-30. See discussion infra Part III.A.
See infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
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This Comment examines Chubb and concludes that, contrary to the
Second Circuit's decision, treaty relations do exist between two countries
where one has signed only the Hague Protocol and the other has signed only
the Warsaw Convention. Part II summarizes Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana
Airlines. Part III describes relevant portions of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol. Part IV.A analyzes the Chubb decision in light of the
Hague Protocol and general principles of treaty interpretation, and concludes
that the Second Circuit incorrectly decided the question regarding treaty
relations between the United States and South Korea. Part IV.B analyzes the
Chubb decision in light of U.S. jurisdictional law, and concludes that the
Second Circuit incorrectly decided the Chubb case regarding federal
question subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a treaty relationship.
II. CHUBB & SON, INC. v. ASIANA AIRLINES
On August 4, 1995, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. '0 delivered
seventeen parcels of computer chips to Asiana Airlines ("Asiana")" for
shipment from Seoul to Samsung Semiconductor, Inc. 12 in San Jose,
California.13 The Asiana air waybill provided for shipment on a nonstop
flight from Seoul to San Francisco,14 but due to an excess of goods to be
shipped, Asiana instead transported the parcels on a flight to Los Angeles.' 5
The parcels were then trucked to San Francisco.' 6 Two of the seventeen
parcels, weighing 35.3 kg (less than seventy-eight pounds) and valued at
$583,000, were missing upon arrival at San Francisco.'
7
Samsung Semiconductor's insurer, Chubb & Son, Inc. ("Chubb"), 18
reimbursed Samsung Semiconductor according to the cargo insurance policy
10 A South Korean corporation. Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 303 (2d Cir.
2000).
1 A South Korean corporation. Id.
12 A California corporation (subsidiary of the Samsung Group, South Korea). CAL. SECRETARY OF
STATE, CORP. REC., available at LEXIS, CA Secretary of State Corporation Information file.
13 Pl.'s Compl. at 2, Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 1997 WL 1040543 (S.D.N.Y. June 17,
1997) (No. 96 Civ. 5082).
14 Aff. for PI. in Supp. of Partial Summ. J., Ex. A, Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 1997 WL
1040543 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1997) (No. 96 Civ. 5082).
'" Chubb, 214 F.3d at 303.
16 id.17 Id. at 304.
's A New York corporation. N.Y. DEP'T OF STATE, CORP. REC., available at LEXIS, NY
Department of State Corporation and Limited Partnership Information file.
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it had issued.' 9 Chubb, as subrogee of Samsung Semiconductor, initiated a
lawsuit in federal district court seeking recovery of its claim payment.2 °
Chubb claimed federal question subject matter jurisdiction21 under 28
22U.S.C. § 1331. Asiana argued that the Warsaw Convention limited its
liability.23 Although the United States adhered only to the original Warsaw
Convention 24 and South Korea adhered only to the Hague Protocol 25 at the
time of the 1995 Samsung shipment, both parties initially agreed that the
Warsaw Convention governed the dispute.26
The district court determined that only those portions of the Warsaw
Convention to which both parties had agreed should apply to the case.27
Thus, only the unamended sections of the treaty were applicable.28 Under
this theory, the district court held that the Warsaw Convention limited
Asiana's liability to $706.29
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that
"the actions of the United States and South Korea did not create treaty
,,00relations with regard to the international carriage of goods by air ....
The court reasoned that the original Warsaw Convention and the Warsaw
Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol were two separate treaties.
31
'9 Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301,304 (2d Cir. 2000).
20 id.
21 Pl.'s Compl. at 1-2, Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 1997 WL 1040543 (S.D.N.Y. June 17,
1997) (No. 96 Civ. 5082).
22 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
23 Chubb, 214 F.3d at 304.
24 See discussion infra Part III.A.
25 See discussion infra Part III.B.
26 Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, No. 96 Civ. 5082, 1997 WL 1040543, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
17, 1997). Thus, in a Report and Recommendation to the district court, Magistrate J. Peck applied the
original version of the Warsaw Convention to determine that the treaty's liability limits for the loss of
goods, Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 22(2), should not be available to Asiana Airlines because the
air waybill did not conform to the Warsaw Convention's requirement that 'stopping places' en route be
specified. Id. arts. 8(c), 9. Chubb, 1997 WL 1040543, at *6. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying
text 27 See Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, No. 96 Civ. 5082, 1998 WL 647185, at *4, *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1998).
28 Id. at *6.
29 Id. at *7. District Judge Preska found that the 'stopping places' requirement, Warsaw Convention,
supra note 3, art. 8(c), did not form part of the treaty agreement between the United States and South
Korea, because Article 8(c) had been deleted by the Hague Protocol. Chubb, 1998 WL 647185, at *6.
With the Article 8(c) bar to the liability limitation removed, and since the section of the treaty which gave
rise to the cause of action, Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 18, had not been amended, and the
liability limit for lost or damaged cargo, id. art. 22(2), remained unchanged (even though the paragraph had
been reworded), the district court held that Asiana's liability was limited by the "hybrid" treaty formed by
the common portions of the two versions. Chubb, 1998 WL 647185, at *7. See infra notes 39 and 51 and
accompanying text.
3 Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 314 (2d Cir. 2000).
3" Seeid. at310.
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Thus, the two countries' actions were independent and unrelated, and did not
result in any formal agreement. 32 The court of appeals went on to hold that
because "the United States and South Korea [were] not in treaty relations
with regard to the international carriage of goods by air, th[e] dispute d[id]
not arise under a treaty of the United States and the district court [was]
thereby deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. 33
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE
PROTOCOL
A. The Warsaw Convention
The international community negotiated the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 ("Warsaw Convention") 34 in an effort
to unify international law governing air transportation. 3 The Warsaw
Convention is one of the oldest treaties creating uniform rules for a specific
area of private law.
36
The Warsaw Convention sought, in part, to establish and to place
limitations upon air carriers' liability for personal injury or death and loss or
damage to property. Article 18 provides that a carrier shall be presumed
liable for damages sustained in the event of loss of goods.38  Article 22
provides the liability limitations. 39 Article 9 requires that certain
32 See id. at 310-14. The court of appeals rejected the district court's creation of a "hybrid" treaty
because it amounted to the court's rewriting of the treaty, which violates separation of powers. Id. at 312.
Thus, the court reasoned that neither the original Warsaw Convention, nor the Hague Protocol, nor any part
or combination of the two created any treaty relationship between the United States and South Korea. Id. at
310-14
31 Id. at 314. While the court did not discuss how the treaty question regarding transport of goods
may differ from the treaty question regarding the transport of passengers, the court was careful to specify
"the international carriage of goods," leaving the door open for such an argument on appeal or in a future
case. Id.
34 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3.
31 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 484, 659, (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1992); LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK 5
(1988).
16 GEORGETTE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE WARSAW SYSTEM IN
MUNICIPAL COURTS 2 (1977).
37 OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 659. The limitations on liability were intended to improve the
insurability of the then fledgling air carriers. GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 35, at 5.
31 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 18.
39 The original treaty allowed 125,000 francs, id. art. 22(1), (about $8300 in U.S. courts, Chubb &
Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 2000)) for passenger injury or death, and 250
francs per kilogram, Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 22(2), ($20 per kilogram in U.S. courts, Chubb,
214 F.3d at 306) for lost or damaged goods. In addition, carriers and passengers may enter into a 'special
MAY 2001
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"particulars" listed in Article 8 be included on the air waybill in order for the
carrier to avail itself of the liability limitation on the transportation of
goods.4° Of particular relevance to the Chubb dispute, Article 8(c) requires
that any "agreed stopping places" en route be specified on the air waybill.4'
Jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention is determined under
Article 1, which provides in relevant part:
1. This Convention shall apply to all international
transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by
aircraft for hire....
2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression
"international transportation" shall mean any transportation in
which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place
of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there
be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated
either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or
within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there
is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to . . .
another power, even though that power is not a party to this
convention.
Thus, in order for jurisdiction under the treaty to attach, both the country of
departure and the country of destination must be parties to the treaty, or the
transportation must be a round trip originating in a country that is a party to
the treaty with a stopover in another country. 4W
contract,' or shippers may make a 'special declaration' of the value and pay a supplementary sum to
increase the carriers' liability limits. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 22(l)-(2).
40 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 9 ("[I]f the air consignment note does not contain all the
particulars set out in Article 8(a) to (i) inclusive and (q), the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of
the provisions of this Convention which exclude or limit his liability.").
41 Id. art. 8(c). Article 8 states, in relevant part: "The air consignment note shall contain the
following particulars: . . . (b) the place of departure and of destination; (c) the agreed stopping places,
provided that the carrier may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity .... " Id.
arts. 8(b), 8(c). The Second Circuit has rigidly applied this rule, denying limited liability because of the
omission of this particular. See Mar. Ins. Co. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 983 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1993); see
also infra note 196 and accompanying text.
4 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 1. The Article 8(c) stopping places requirement was
included to give notice of this second classification of international carriage. G. Nathan Calkins, Grand
Canyon, Warsaw and The Hague Protocol, 23 J. AIR L. 253, 258-59 (1956).
43 It is noteworthy that the citizenship or residence of the airline (and that of passengers, when
applicable) has no bearing on jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention. GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 35, at
10.
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The Warsaw Convention entered into force for the United States on
October 29, 1934.44 In the context of severe economic depression, the treaty
was seen as allowing passengers and shippers some degree of relief while
protecting fledgling air carriers from excessive liability.45 The Warsaw
Convention allowed for a maximum compensation of $8300 for passenger
injury or death, and $20 per kilogram of lost or damaged goods. 46  The
United States, as well as other countries, soon became disillusioned with the
low wrongful death liability limit of the Warsaw Convention.47
B. The Hague Protocol
In response to concerns regarding the inadequacy of the wrongful
death liability limitation, 4  the international community negotiated the
Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air ("Hague Protocol"), 49 doubling the
maximum compensation for wrongful death.50 However, the liability limit
for lost or damaged goods in Article 22(2) remained unchanged: although
Article XI of the Hague Protocol reworded the original Article 22(2), it
expressly incorporated the $20 per kilogram limitation.51 In addition, the
Hague Protocol amended Article 8 to require the inclusion of "agreed
stopping places" on the air waybill only when the places of departure anddestination are both in the same country. 52 Finally, although reworded, the
jurisdiction requirements of Article 1 remained substantively unchanged.
53
44 U.S. DEP'TOF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 344 (2000).
4' GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 35, at 5.
46 Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 2000); see supra note 39.
47 See MILLER, supra note 36, at 37; Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 502-04 (1967).
48 See MILLER, supra note 36, at 37; GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 35, at 96.
49 Hague Protocol, supra note 6.
50 Id. art. XI (raising the liability limit for wrongful death to 250,000 francs). The equivalent amount
in dollars is $16,600. Chubb, 214 F.3d at 306.
51 Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. XI. See supra notes 39 and 46 and accompanying text.
52 Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. VI. Most of the "particulars" required by Article 8 of the
Warsaw Convention were eliminated and a new requirement was added that the air waybill
contain ... a notice ... to the effect that, if the carriage involves an ultimate destination or stop
in a country other than the country of departure, the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and
... in most cases limits the liability of carriers....
Id. Furthermore, Article 9 was amended to deny the liability limits only if an air waybill is not made
out, or if it "does not include the notice required by Article 8 ... " Id. art. VII. Thus, under the Hague
Protocol, the liability limitation for the loss of goods would be applicable in Chubb.
"3 Compare Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. I with Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.
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As its title implies, the Hague Protocol took the form of a list of
revisions to the Warsaw Convention. The Hague Protocol did not recite the
text of unamended Warsaw Convention articles, nor even the full text of the
amended articles.54 Instead, the Hague Protocol comprised only the text of
the individual paragraphs that were amended. It was thus required that "the
Convention and the Protocol shall be read and interpreted together as one
single instrument and shall be known as the Warsaw Convention as amended
at The Hague, 1955." 55  The Hague Protocol explicitly specified that
"[r]atification of... [or]... [a]dherence to this Protocol by any State which
is not a Party to the Convention shall have the effect of adherence to the
[Warsaw] Convention as amended by [the Hague] Protocol. 56
The Hague Protocol entered into force for South Korea on October 11,
1967.57 South Korea had not participated in the negotiation of the original
Warsaw Convention, 58 and did not separately adhere to it.59 The majority of
the parties to the Warsaw Convention ratified the Hague Protocol.6 ° In
contrast, because of continued dissatisfaction with the low wrongful death
liability limit, 61 the United States chose not to adhere to the Hague
Protocol.62
54 See generally Hague Protocol, supra note 6.
55 Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. XIX (emphasis in original).
56 Id. art. XXI, para. 2, art. XXIII, para. 2.
57 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 35, at 287.
58 The Republic of Korea did not gain its independence until September 9, 1948, nearly twenty years
after the negotiation of the Warsaw Convention. BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PAC. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: KOREA, at http://www.state.gov/www/background-notes/southkorea_
0006 bgn.html (June. 2000).
-59 As of May 1988, seven countries adhered to the Hague Protocol but not to the original Warsaw
Convention: El Salvador (Sept. 17, 1956), Guatemala (July 17, 1971), Malawi (June 9, 1971), Monaco
(Apr. 9, 1979), Republic of Korea (July 13 1967), Singapore (Nov. 6, 1967), and Swaziland (July 20,
1971). See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 35, at 285-88.
60 As of May 1988, ninety-six countries adhered to both the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 35, at 285-88.
6' Ren6 H. Mankiewicz, Hague Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 78,
80-81 (1955); GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 35, at 96.
62 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 344 (2000); MILLER, supra note 36, at 37. On
September 28, 1998 the United States ratified Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October
1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on 28 September 1955 ("Montreal Protocol No. 4")
(which was signed in 1975, J.C. Batra, Modernization of the Warsaw System-Montreal 1999, 65 J. AIR L.
& COM. 429, 432 (2000)), and thereby acceded to the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague
Protocol and as amended by Montreal Protocol No. 4. Chubb & Son Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301,
307 n.4 (2d Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, by extension of the Second Circuit's reasoning, that action still did
not create treaty relations between the United States and any country that adheres only to the Hague
Protocol, for the same reasons that the court found that South Korea is not bound by the original Warsaw
Convention. Rather, the United States is in treaty relations with countries that adhere to the original
Warsaw Convention, or to Montreal Protocol No. 4, or both, but not with countries that adhere solely to the
Hague Protocol, since the United States never consented to the amendments of the Hague Protocol without
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IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY DECIDED CHUBB BECAUSE
TREATY RELATIONS EXISTED BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND THE
UNITED STATES
Having determined that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to the
international transportation of goods by air between South Korea and the
United States, and without so much as discussing the law regarding subject
matter jurisdiction, the court of appeals summarily concluded that the district
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.63 This Comment refutes both
of the court's determinations: first, that there was no treaty relationship
between the two countries, and second, that a lack of treaty relations would
deprive the court of federal question subject matter jurisdiction.
Instead, this Comment contends first, that South Korea's adherence to
the Hague Protocol created treaty relations not only with parties to the
amending agreement, but also with respect to parties to the original treaty.
Second, it maintains that even in the absence of treaty relations between the
two countries, the question of whether or not treaty relations existed under
the circumstances in Chubb presented a federal question sufficient to confer
discretion upon the lower federal courts to adjudicate any related claims.
A. South Korea's Adherence to the Hague Protocol Created Treaty
Relations Between South Korea and the United States
Customary international law and general principles of treaty
interpretation indicate that by way of adherence to the Hague Protocol,
South Korea became a party to the original Warsaw Convention with respect
to states which, like the United States, adhere only to the original treaty.
Significantly, the subsequent practice of the two countries demonstrates that
they intended to have a treaty relationship under the Warsaw Convention. In
addition, most scholars agree that adherence to the Hague Protocol creates
treaty relations with states that adhere only to the original Warsaw
Convention. Finally, policy considerations compel recognition of treaty
relations between states that are parties solely to the Hague Protocol and
states that are parties solely to the Warsaw Convention.
the provisions of Montreal Protocol No. 4. In addition, by the court of appeals' reasoning the United States
is bound by the terms of the original Warsaw Convention with respect to countries that adhere to both that
treaty and the Hague Protocol but not to Montreal Protocol No. 4.
63 Chubb, 214 F.3d at 314.
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1. Overview of the Relevant International Law of Treaties
Whether or not a treaty relationship existed between South Korea and
the United States at the time of the shipment in Chubb depends on the effect
of South Korea's adherence to the Hague Protocol with respect to countries
that were parties solely to the original Warsaw Convention. 64 In order to
answer this question the court must interpret international law, since
"[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination."
65
The Statute of the International Court of Justice,66 which is generally
accepted as authoritatively enunciating the sources of international law, 67
summarizes the sources of international law as follows:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by
the contesting States;
(b) international custom, 68 as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59,69 judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as
6 See MILLER, supra note 36, at 38.
65 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
6 The International Court of Justice, as the principle judicial organ of the United Nations, settles in
accordance with international law legal disputes submitted by various countries. INT'L CT. OF JUSTICE,
GENERAL INFORMATION-THE COURT AT A GLANCE, at http://www.icj-cij.orgicjwww/
igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (n.d.).
67 Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts,
28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 381 (1988).
68 Custom is the oldest and the original source of international law. OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at
25.
69 Article 59 of the I.C.J. Statute provides that there is no doctrine of binding precedent in the I.C.J.
STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. art. 59, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext
ibasicstatute.htm (n.d.). See FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 81 (Vaughan Lowe
& Malgosia Fitzmaurice, eds. 1996) [hereinafter FIFTY YEARS OF THE ICJ].
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subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.7°
Within the first category, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 71 ("Vienna Convention") attempted to codify the international law
of treaties. 72  However, a treaty binds only the contracting states; 73 thus,
because the United States never ratified the Vienna Convention, 74 it is not
binding with regard to the question presented in Chubb. Instead, the
question of whether a treaty relationship existed is left to the second
category, customary international law.75
Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation.76 Customary
rules are comprised of two elements: (1) state practice and (2) acceptance as
law (opinio jurs 77 ).7 1 While treaties are a relatively straightforward source
of law, custom is often much less clear. 79 This is so because it is often
difficult to discover what states actually do, determine the weight to give to
their acts, and draw normative conclusions from these acts.80 Legislation
and national judicial decisions may be considered when determining state
70 STATUTE OF THE I.C.J. supra note 69, art. 38, para. 1.
71 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
72 From its inception, the United Nations initiated studies and making recommendations to
encourage the progressive development of international law and its codification. OPPENHEIM, supra note
35, at 103. Toward this end, the U.N. General Assembly formed the International Law Commission
("ILC") in 1947. Id. at 103-04. The ILC began work on the law of treaties in 1950. SHABTAI ROSENNE,
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986, at 2 (1989) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS]. The ILC
was intensively engaged in the codification of the law of treaties between 1962 and 1966. SHABTAI
ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 29
(1970). The ILC adopted the final draft articles on the law of treaties in 1966. Id. at 15. The basic
proposal before the Vienna Conference was the Final Draft of the ILC. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES: TRAVAUX PRPARATOIRES 20 (compiled by Dr. Ralf Giinter Wetzel; Professor Dr.
Dietrich Rauschning ed. 1978) [hereinafter TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES]; see also OPPENHEIM, supra note
35, at 1198.
73 OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 1260 (explaining that generally a treaty does not create obligations
or rights for a third state without its consent).
The Senate objected to the Vienna Convention primarily because it defines "treaty" too broadly.
Frankowska, supra note 67, at 296-97. The Senate also objected to the Vienna Convention's provision that
a violation of treaty-making procedure may invalidate a state's consent to be bound. Id.
'5 TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES, supra note 72, at 6; see OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 1198-99.
76 Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 51 (3d ed. 1993).
77 A belief that international law, as opposed to moral obligation, mandates the conduct. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1119 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 1999).
78 FIFTY YEARS OF THE ICJ, supra note 69, at 68. See S.S. Lotus (Turkey v. France), 1927 P.C.I.J.,
(ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 7), 4 Ann. Dig. 5, 7; North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark), 1969
I.C.J. 3, 44, para. 77 (Feb. 20), 41 I.L.R. 29, 73-74.
79 FIFTY YEARS OF THE ICJ, supra note 69, at 67.
so Id.
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practice. 81 Decisions of national courts may also be cited as evidence of
opiniojuris.82 In addition, because of the Vienna Convention's widespread
acceptance,8 3 it serves as an indication of state practice and opiniojuris.84
While the Vienna Convention may not be binding upon nonparty
countries, it nevertheless may serve as a source of customary international
law. 85 The International Court of Justice has held that a multilateral
convention might codify existing customary law, and that the process of
elaborating and concluding a convention might crystallize a customary rule,
86
which was previously only emerging. Many of the Vienna Convention's
articles codified existing customary international law regarding the law of
treaties. 87 In addition, because the Vienna Convention enumerated the
signatories' understanding of international law, the contents of the treaty
represent evidence of customary international law.88 Thus, as explained by
the court of appeals in Chubb, even though the United States has not ratified
the Vienna Convention, the United States has generally recognized the
S Id. at 69. See, e.g., Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, 1955 I.C.J. 4, 22-23
(Apr. 6), 22 I.L.R. 358-60; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Second
Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 38-39, paras. 56-58 (Feb. 5), 46 I.L.R. 178, 212-13.
82 FIFTY YEARS OF THE ICJ, supra note 69, at 82; see OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 41 ("Decisions of
courts and tribunals are a subsidiary and indirect source of international law.").
83 Seventy-nine countries approved the final text. TRAVAUX PRItPARATOIRES, supra note 72, at 12.
84 See FIFTY YEARS OF THE ICJ, supra note 69, at 69 (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany
v. Denmark), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42, pars. 73 (Feb. 20), 41 I.L.R. 29, 72 ("[E]ven without the passage of any
considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative participation . . . might suffice of
itself.")).
" See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 72, at 123-24.
86 FIFTY YEARS OF THE ICJ, supra note 69, at 73. It should be noted, however, that decisions of the
I.C.J. are not a direct source of law in international adjudications. OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 41. See
also id. at 33-34.
8 TRAVAUX PRItPARATOIRES, supra note 72, at 12. However, codification has at least two distinct
meanings: (1) translating into statutes conventions of customary law with little or no alteration of the law;
and (2) securing agreement among states based on existing international law, both customary and
conventional, but modified so as to reconcile conflicting views and render agreement possible.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 97 n.l. A number of the Vienna Convention's provisions reflect the
"progressive development of intemational law" rather than custom. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 416-
17. Thus, the ILC "deliberately included a statement to the effect that the draft articles contain elements of
progressive development and of codification of the law .... DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 72, at 6; see also
TRAVAUX PRIPARATOIRES, supra note 72, at 8. The ILC Statute defines "progressive development" as
"the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or
in regard to which the law has not been sufficiently developed in the practice of States," and "codification"
as "the more precise formulation and systematization of rules of public international law in fields where
there has already been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine." DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 72, at
6.
88 See OLIVER J. LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY AND TOMORROw 34 (1965) ("[A] treaty
may also record the parties' understanding of a norm of general international law and thus serve as
evidence of the latter."); see also TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES, supra note 72, at 12.
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Vienna Convention as an authoritative guide to the customary international
law of treaties.
89
The executive branch has often cited the Vienna Convention as an
authoritative codification of customary international law. 90 In some
instances, the Department of State has even changed its position on
customary rules regarding the law of treaties based on the Vienna
Convention. 9' Other countries, as well as the International Court of Justice,
also recognize that to a large degree the Vienna Convention is a restatement
of the customary international law of treaties. 92  Thus, even though U.S.
courts are not constrained to follow the formal scheme of the Vienna
Convention, 93 it is nonetheless considered the principal authoritative source
of the law of treaties.94 As a result, U.S. courts frequently cite the Vienna
Convention when determining the international law of treaties.
95
2. Under General Principles of Treaty Interpretation, Article 40(5) of
the Vienna Convention Suggests that South Korea 's Adherence to the
Hague Protocol May Have Created Warsaw Convention Treaty
Relations Between South Korea and the United States
At the time of the shipment in Chubb, South Korea adhered to the
Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol but did not
separately adhere to the original Warsaw Convention. 96 Article 40(5) of the
89 Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308-09 (2d Cir. 2000). The American Law
Institute took the Vienna Convention as its "black letter" for setting out principles relating to the law of
treaties. Frankowska, supra note 67, at 286.
90 Frankowska, supra note 67, at 286, 298-301. As of 1998, the specific provisions the State
Department regarded as codifying existing law included articles 2, 18, 20, 25, 26, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 46, 56,
60, and 63. Id. at 299 n.81. U.S. courts give weight to the Government's interpretation of international
law. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 160 (2000). See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-86 (1982).
91 Frankowska, supra note 67, at 301.
92 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 416-17; Frankowska, supra note 67, at 286.
13 AUST, supra note 90, at 160; see also Frankowska, supra note 67, at 286-87.
9 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 416.
95 See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993) (Blackmun, 1.,
dissenting) (citing art. 31(1)); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 n.5 (1982) (citing art. 2(l)(a)); Tseng
v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing arts. 31 and 32); Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361-62 (2d Cir. 1992) ("We have previously applied the Vienna
Convention in interpreting treaties (citation omitted) as has the United States Department of State.");
Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1296 n.40 (11 th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638 n.9 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Although the United
States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it regards the substantive provisions of the Vienna
Convention as codifying the international law of treaties.")).
96 See Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301,304 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Vienna Convention addresses the effect of a new party's adherence to a
treaty after an amending agreement has entered into force:
5. Any State which becomes a party to the treaty after the
entry into force of the amending agreement shall, failing
an expression of a different intention by that State:
(a) be considered a party to the treaty as amended; and
(b) be considered as a party to the unamended treaty in
relation to any party to the treaty not bound by the
amending agreement.
97
The Second Circuit in Chubb found ambiguity in the phrase "becomes
a party to the treaty." 98 The court questioned whether this was intended to
mean (1) accession to the original treaty after an amending instrument has
entered into force, or (2) accession to the amended treaty after an amending
instrument has entered into force.99 Having identified this ambiguity, the
court put Article 40(5) aside, without applying the Vienna Convention's
factors for treaty interpretation.100 Parts IV.A.2(a) and (b) will apply the
principles of treaty interpretation set forth in the Vienna Convention in an
attempt to ascertain the meaning of Article 40(5).
a. The Vienna Convention's principles of treaty interpretation
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention provide guidelines for
the interpretation of treaties. These articles are widely considered to be
representative of customary international law. 101 In addition, the
International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have
held that these articles reflect customary international law. 1°2 Article 31,
"General rule of interpretation," begins:
97 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 40, para. 5. Article 40 was passed unanimously by the
members of the Convention. TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES, supra note 72, at 299.
98 Chubb, 214 F.3d at 309.
99 Id.
'0' Id. at 309-10.
1o1 See Frankowska, supra note 67, at 299 n.8 1; Jim6mez de Ar6chaga, International Law in the Past
Third of a Century, 159 Rec. des Cours 42-48 (1978-1) quoted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 475
("Legal rules concerning the interpretation of treaties constitute one of the Sections of the Vienna
Convention which were adopted without a dissenting vote at the Conference and consequently may be
considered as declaratory of existing law.").
102 See Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 21, 100 I.L.R. 1, 20 (Feb. 3); Golder v.
United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5, 14, 57 I.L.R. 200, 213-14 (1975).
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(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.l°3
This article puts the textual approach to interpretation, which seeks to
determine a treaty's meaning from its text, ahead of the functional approach,
which seeks to give effect to the common or real intention of the parties.' 0
4
The Commentary to the International Law Commission ("ILC")' °5 Final
Draft of proposed articles for the Vienna Convention explained that the
proposed method of interpretation was "based on the view that the text must
be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties;
and that, in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the
elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the
intentions of the parties. ' 1°
Despite the Vienna Convention's emphasis on the textual approach,
determination of the ordinary meaning cannot be done in the abstract, but
rather, only in the context of the treaty and in light of its objectives and
purpose. 107 Therefore, treaty interpretation begins with an analysis of the
specific provisions of the treaty concerning the question in dispute, 08 and
goes on to consider the context. Other provisions of the treaty, including its
preamble, annexes, and related instruments made in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty, give particular emphasis to the object and purpose
of the treaty as it appears from these materials.'
9
At the practical level, the consideration given the travaux
prdparatoires"° of the treaty distinguishes the textual approach from the
functional approach."' Functionalists put the travaux pr paratoires on the
same level as the text, whereas textualists assign more importance to the
103 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 31, para. 1.
104 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 475-76; OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 1271.
t05 See supra note 72.
06 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 476.
:07 AUST, supra note 90, at 188.
108 See, e.g., Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1997).
09 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 476. This approach falls short, however, of making the object
and purpose an autonomous element in interpretation, independent of and on the same level as the text, as
is advocated by the partisans of the teleological approach to interpretation. Id.
" The French for preparatory works. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1119 (Bryan A. Garner ed.,
1999). Travaux priparatoires include successive drafts of the treaty, conference records, explanatory
statements by an expert consultant at a codification conference, uncontested interpretive statements by the
chairman of a drafting committee and ILC, and Commentaries. AUST, supra note 90, at 197.
111 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 476.
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text. The Vienna Convention again favors the textualist approach. Article
32, "Supplementary means of interpretation," provides:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
article 31:
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable. 1
1 2
Thus, when the text is ambiguous, the travaux pr~paratoires may help
determine the meaning. 113
Nevertheless, the inclusion of this rule in a separate article does not
require that the travaux pr~paratoires be examined only after exhausting the
methods of Article 31.114 The process is largely a simultaneous one. As one
of the drafters commented, "all the various elements, as they were present in
any given case, would be thrown into the crucible and their interaction
would give the legally relevant interpretation." 115 In practice, the
preparatory works are frequently examined and often taken into account. 116
b. Application of articles 31 and 32 to the construction of article 40(5)
The general rule of international law is that a state cannot be bound by
a treaty unless the state gives its consent." 7 However, once a treaty has been
amended, if a new party accedes to either the original version or to the
amending agreement, the new party's intent is not clear. Article 40(5) of the
Vienna Convention addresses the situation where a state "becomes a party to
the treaty after the entry into force of the amending agreement."" 8 The
source of confusion is whether the word "treaty" refers to the original treaty
or to the amended treaty. 19 The text gives no apparent indication as to the
specific meaning of this phrase. In subsections (a) and (b) of Article 40(5),
112 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 32.
113 AUST, supra note 90, at 197.
114 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 477.
115 Id.
116 Id.; see, e.g., Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1997).
117 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 34; OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 1260.
118 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 40, para. 5; see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra text accompanying note 99.
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the drafters selected the more specific terms "the treaty as amended" and
"the unamended treaty," respectively. 120 In ordinary usage, in the context of
a multilateral treaty that has been amended, Article 40(5) could equally refer
to the original treaty after the amending agreement comes into force, or to
the amended treaty.
It seems certain that the drafters of the Vienna Convention at a
minimum intended to address the situation where a state accedes only to the
original treaty. Consulting the travaux pr~paratoires provides some insight
into the meaning of Article 40(5). The Commentary to the ILC Final Draft
indicates that paragraph five was added to that draft during the ILC's final
session 121 in order to address the ambiguous and potentially confusing
situation where a state adheres to the original treaty after an amending
instrument has entered into force:
The problem then is what is to be the position of a State which
only becomes a party to the original treaty after the amending
agreement is already in force. . . . [T]he Commission was
informed by the Secretariat that it is by no means uncommon
for a State to ratify or otherwise establish its consent to the
treaty without giving any indication as to its intentions
regarding the amending agreement;' 22 and that in these cases
the instrument of ratification, acceptance, etc. is presumed by
the Secretary-General in his capacity as a depositary to cover
the treaty with its amendments.
The question then becomes whether the drafters meant to address only
the situation where a state accedes solely to the original treaty. It should be
noted that "the use of similar but different terms, or a change in terminology
from an earlier text . . . may indicate that the drafters intended a general
meaning for the terms rather than a strict and specific meaning."' 24 Thus,
the drafters' choice to omit the word "original" in the final text of Article
40(5) may indicate a deliberate attempt to make the provision more
expansive than the ILC Draft Commentary. It is plausible that the final text
120 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 40, para. 5; see supra note 97 and accompanying text.
121 TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES, supra note 72, at 298.
122 As of May 1988, twenty-one countries adhered to the original Warsaw Convention but not to the
Hague Protocol. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 35, at 285-92. At least nine of these acceded to the Warsaw
Convention after the Hague Protocol had come into force. Id.
123 TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES, supra note 72, at 298-99 (citing the Commentary to the ILC Final
Draft); see also T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 93 n.7 (1974).
124 OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 1273 n.12.
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was intended to have effect if the new party became a party to either the
original treaty or the amended treaty.
This is evident from the ILC Draft Commentary, which explained the
basis upon which the drafters founded paragraph five:
[The Commission] considered that this rule should be based on
two principles: (a) the right of the State, on becoming a party
to the treaty, to decide whether to become a party to the treaty
alone, to the treaty plus the amending agreement or to the
amended treaty alone; (b) in the absence of any indication by
the State, it is desirable to adopt a solution which will bring the
maximum number of States into mutual relations under the
treaty. 125
Undeniably, in the situation where a new party adheres only to the
original treaty, the drafters of Article 40(5) chose to favor the second
principle.126 As one commentator pointed out, "[t]he substance of paragraph
five lies in its subparagraph (a), which establishes the presumption that the
State also becomes a party to the treaty as amended. The State is presumed
bound by the amending agreement, although it did not expressly consent to
such agreement."' 127 The members of the Vienna Conference unanimously
voted in favor of this exception to the general rule that without its express
consent a state is not bound by any agreement. 128 The same line of
reasoning may well have led the drafters to the conclusion that this
exception should also govern the situation where a state becomes a party to
the amending agreement but does not expressly consent to the original
version of the treaty.
This construction-that Article 40(5) was intended to have effect if
the new party became a party to either the original treaty or the amended
treaty-would be consistent with the principle of maximum effectiveness,
which has been recognized by the International Court of Justice in the
context of treaty interpretation.1 29 Under this rule, other things being equal,
"texts are to be presumed to have been intended to have a definite force and
effect, and should be interpreted so as to have such force ... and so as to
125 TRAVAUX PRIPARATOIRES, supra note 72, at 299.
126 See ELIAS, supra note 123, at 93.
127 Frankowska, supra note 67, at 365.
128 TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRES, supra note 72, at 299; see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
129 G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y. B. I. L. 1, 8-9, 18-20 (1951).
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have the fullest value and effect consistent with their wording . . . and with
the other parts of the text."'130 On the other hand, care must be taken in
attributing significance to variations in terminology, lest an interpreter "find
himself distorting passages [because] he imagines that the drafting is
stamped with infallibility. 13'
In summary, the aim of treaty interpretation is tQ determine "the
meaning of the text which the parties must be taken to have intended it to
bear in relation to the circumstances with reference to which the question of
interpretation has arisen." 132 Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the
parties to the Vienna Convention intended Article 40(5) to bear any meaning
in relation to the circumstances in which a state adheres to an amending
agreement but does not expressly adhere to the original treaty. While the
travauxpr~paratoires hed some light on the subject, they leave the question
unresolved.
Nevertheless, in light of the generally accepted presumption that a
new party to a treaty is bound by an existing amending agreement even if the
state did not expressly consent to it, and given the principle of maximum
effectiveness, it would not be unreasonable to infer that adherence to an
amending agreement results not only in treaty relations with parties to the
amending agreement, but also with parties to the original treaty. In fact,
some experts have construed Article 40(5) in this fashion. 133 If this
interpretation is accepted, South Korea should be considered to have a
proper treaty relationship with the United States regarding the Warsaw
Convention.
3. Under General Principles of Treaty Interpretation, South Korea's
Adherence to the Hague Protocol Created Treaty Relations Between
South Korea and the United States
Regardless of whether Article 40(5) is construed to have effect in the
scenario presented in Chubb, the provisions of the Hague Protocol may be
dispositive, because a specific provision of a treaty takes precedence over
the general law of treaties.' 34 That is to say, the specific provisions of the
Hague Protocol may determine the result of adherence to the Hague Protocol
130 Id. (emphasis in original) quoted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 480; see also Benjamins v.
British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[T]he Convention is to be so construed as to
further its purposes to the greatest extent possible .... ).
131 Pertulosa Claim, 18 I.L.R. 414, 418 (Franco-Italian Council Comm'n 1951).
132 OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 1267.
13 See infra Part 1V.A.4.b.
134 See Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 40, para. 1.
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without express adherence to the Warsaw Convention in accordance with, or
even contrary to, the intended meaning of Article 40(5).
a. The ordinary meaning of the text of the Hague Protocol does not
provide a definitive answer to the issue in Chubb
Articles XXI and XXIII of the Hague Protocol provide that
ratification or "[a]dherence to this Protocol by any State which is not a Party
to the [Warsaw] Convention shall have the effect of adherence to the
[Warsaw] Convention as amended by this Protocol."' 135 The court of appeals
focused on the words "as amended" to support the conclusion that adherence
to the Hague Protocol cannot bind states to the original Warsaw
Convention. 136 However, some commentators have construed this language
as binding the new party to the original treaty with respect to states that
adhere solely to the original Warsaw Convention. 1
37
In addition, the Hague Protocol provides that "[f]or the purposes of
this Convention, 138 the expression international carriage means any carriage
in which . . . the place of departure and the place of destination . . . are
,, 139situated ... within the territories of two High Contracting Parties ....
The Hague Protocol adds Article 40 A, which provides in relevant part that
"the expression High Contracting Party shall mean a State whose ratification
of or adherence to the Convention 140 has become effective and whose
denunciation thereof has not become effective." 141
The wording of these articles does not distinguish between High
Contracting Parties to the Hague Protocol and to the Warsaw Convention. A
reasonable inference is that the drafters of the Hague Protocol intended
parties to the original Warsaw Convention, which ratified the Hague
Protocol, to continue in treaty relations with parties to the original treaty that
chose not to ratify the amending agreement. 142 It is not clear, however,
'a Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. XXI, para. 2; art. XXIII, para. 2.
36 Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 2000).
'" See infra Part IV.A.4.a.
:35 It should be noted that the Hague Protocol is replete with references to "this Convention," a phrase
which seems to inextricably intertwine the Hague Protocol with the Warsaw Convention. See, e.g., Hague
Protocol, supra note 6, arts. I-IV, IX, XIV.
139 Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. I, para. (a) (emphasis in original). Although the wording in this
paragraph was modified from the original Warsaw Convention, the relevant wording quoted here did not
.change. Compare this with Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 2; see supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
140 Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. XVII. References to "the Convention" in the Hague Protocol
generally refer specifically to the original Warsaw Convention.
:41 Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. XVII.
42 See Mankiewicz, supra note 61, at 89-90.
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whether the drafters intended that (or even discussed) whether new parties to
the Hague Protocol alone should be in treaty relations with parties to the
original Warsaw Convention.
The text of the Hague Protocol does not provide a definite answer to
this question. Given this uncertainty, an interpretation of the Hague Protocol
must look beyond the text.
b. The subsequent practice of the United States and South Korea
confirms that both parties intended to create treaty relations under the
Warsaw Convention
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, "General rule of interpretation,"
provides:
(3) There shall be taken into account, together with the
context:
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation. 143
Thus, when the meaning of the text in a treaty is uncertain, the
relevant conduct of the contracting parties after the conclusion of the treaty
has a high probative value as to their intent. 44 This is sometimes referred to
as "practical construction.' ' 145 In general, if one of the parties to a treaty
makes known the meaning it attributes to a provision, and a dispute later
arises regarding the application of that provision, another party cannot then
insist upon a different meaning, unless that party has previously taken
necessary steps-such as protest-to rebut the implication that it has
acquiesced to the first party's interpretation. 1
46
Subsequent practice constitutes objective evidence of the parties'
agreement as to the meaning of the treaty. 147 Thus, if a treaty has been
commonly applied by the parties-even in a manner different from that
contemplated at the time of its conclusion-the "subsequent practice, and
the new expectations connected with it, may properly form the basis of
interpretation." 148 For this reason, U.S. courts have often relied on
143 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 31, para. 3.
'" Frankowska, supra note 67, at 342.
145 Id.; see, e.g., Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A., 22 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1994).
146 OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 1280.
147 ELIAS, supra note 123, at 76.
148 LISSITZYN, supra note 88, at 28-29.
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subsequent conduct as evidence of the intent of the parties. 49 Of specific
importance to this analysis, a state's conduct may imply consent to accede to
a treaty. 150 Moreover, "[i]t is not necessary that every one of the parties to
the treaty should have engaged in the particular practice; it is sufficient that
there is evidence that every party has accepted the practice, even by tacit
consent or acquiescence."'
151
Prior to Chubb, U.S. courts had decided many cases involving air
transportation between the United States and South Korea under the Warsaw
Convention. For example, multiple lawsuits arose from the Korean Air
Lines ("KAL") flight that was shot down over Soviet airspace on September
1, 1983 while en route from New York to Seoul. 152 While these cases
addressed air carrier liability for passenger death, as opposed to liability for
lost cargo, they were indistinguishable from Chubb with respect to the treaty
relationship between South Korea and the United States. 153 In one case, the
district court dedicated nearly six pages of its opinion to the history of the
Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, and the question of whether
treaty jurisdiction existed in that case. The court of appeals explicitly
adopted the lower court's opinion. 1
54
That case, as well as several others, reached the Supreme Court. 55 In
each of the KAL cases, subject matter jurisdiction was based on the Warsaw
Convention treaty relationship between South Korea and the United
States. 156 By not raising the question of subject matter jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court's ruling on the merits of these cases implicitly affirmed the
existence of a treaty relationship between the United States and South
Korea. 157 Moreover, U.S. courts have found a treaty relationship between
149 Frankowska, supra note 67, at 342; see, e.g., Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 351 F.
Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Barr
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 819 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1987).
:50 LISSITZYN, supra note 88, at 27; see also AUST, supra note 90, at 90.
51 ELIAS, supra note 123, at 76.
52 See, e.g., Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, 524 U.S. 116 (1998); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 516
U.S. 217 (1996); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989); In Re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept.
1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In Re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp.
1463 (D.D.C. 1985).
153 Air carrier liability for passenger death is addressed in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and
liability for lost cargo in Article 18. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 17, 18.
1 4 See Korean Air Lines, 664 F. Supp. at 1464-69, ajfd and opinion adopted 829 F.2d 1171, 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
155 See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, .516 U.S. 217
(1996); Dooley v. Korean Air Lines, 524 U.S. 116 (1998).
316 See supra note 152.
117 The Supreme Court is required to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Mt.
Healthy School Dist. Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). See infra note 206 and
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the United States and South Korea in cases involving air transport of
cargo.1
5 8
South Korea's silence in the face of the U.S. courts' exercise of
jurisdiction over these cases likely demonstrated sufficient acquiescence to
establish tacit consent to the existence of treaty relations between the two
countries. If so, South Korea's conduct amounted to implicit consent to be
bound by the original Warsaw Convention with respect to the United States.
South Korea and the Second Circuit cannot now insist upon a different
interpretation.
4. Most Scholars Agree that when a State Adheres Only to an Amended
Treaty, it Becomes a Party to the Original Treaty with Respect to
States that Are Parties Only to the Original Treaty
The Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates as a
subsidiary source of international law "the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations."'159 A number of highly qualified
scholars have commented on the scenario where a state becomes a party to
an amended treaty but does not expressly adhere to the original treaty. Most
have agreed that in this situation the state becomes a party to the original
treaty with respect to states that are parties only to the original treaty. While
some commentators have based this conclusion on Article 40(5) of the
Vienna Convention, others have looked to the text of the Hague Protocol to
formulate the same conclusion.
a. Scholars examining the Hague Protocol
Mankiewicz, an authority on the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol, 160 contends that a state which adheres solely to the Hague Protocol,
accompanying text. Considering the extent of the district court and court of appeals opinions' treatment of
subject matter jurisdiction, it is reasonable to assume the Supreme Court was fully apprised of the issue.
158 See, e.g., Hyosung (America), Inc. v. Japan Air Lines, 624 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Nissan
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Singapore Airlines, No. C 91-3858, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4589 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
27, 1992).
159 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
'60 Mankiewicz, formerly the Secretary General of the Institute of Comparative Law in Lyons,
France, which sponsored the Hague Conference, published articles about the Hague Protocol as early as
1955. Mankiewicz, supra note 61. He has been a teaching professor at several universities in Canada
(McGill University and Sherrooke University), France (Universit6 de Paris), and other countries.
Diederiks-Verschooor, Foreword to RENt H. MANKIEwICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE
INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER XXIII (1981).
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as South Korea does, also becomes party to the Warsaw Convention. 16 1 He
states that "the original Convention applies not only to carriage between
countries parties to it, but also to carriage between a State that has ratified
the Hague Protocol and a State that is a party only to the original
Convention. It is immaterial whether the former State had previously
ratified the original Convention. ,,162
163Other scholars have applied the same reasoning. Under this
construction of the Hague Protocol, the original Warsaw Convention applied
to air transportation between South Korea, which had ratified the Hague
Protocol, and the United States, which was a party only to the original
Warsaw Convention. According to Mankiewicz, under Articles XXI and
XXIII164 of the Hague Protocol it is immaterial that South Korea had not
previously ratified the Warsaw Convention.' 65 By adhering to the Hague
Protocol, South Korea entered into a treaty relationship with countries that
are parties to the Warsaw Convention but do not adhere to the Hague
Protocol.
Another commentator, although not taking an express stand on the
precise issue at hand, appears to assume that states adhering only to the
Hague Protocol would enter into a treaty relationship with all parties to the
Warsaw Convention. 166 For example, an in-depth discussion of the meaning
of "High Contracting Parties" makes no distinction between High
Contracting Parties to each the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol. 67 On the contrary, it implies that ratification of either the Warsaw
Convention or the Hague Protocol results in a state becoming a High
Contracting Party under the Warsaw Convention.16
8
16' RENt H. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER 2 (1981).
162 Id. at 3. Mankiewicz bases his conclusion not on Article 40(5) of the Vienna Convention, but
rather on the Articles XXI(2) and XXIII(2) of the Hague Protocol. Id. See supra notes 56, 135-137 and
accompanying text.
3 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 35, at 6; see also id. at 12 ("If a country adheres to the Hague Protocol
but is not a signatory to the original Warsaw Convention, it automatically becomes an adherent of the
Warsaw Convention."); Peter H. Sand, Air Carriers' Limitation of Liability and Air Passengers' Accident
Compensation under the Warsaw Convention, 28 J. AIR L. & COMM. 260, 261 n. 10 (1962) ("Pursuant to
Art. XXIII, para. 2, ratification of the Protocol has the effect of adherence to the Convention.").
:64 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
65 MANKIEWICZ, supra note 161, at 3.
:66 See generally MILLER, supra note 36.
61 Id. at 25-36.
161 See id. at 29, 40.
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b. Scholars examining the Vienna Convention
A prominent international law textbook states:
Paragraphs 4 and 5 [of Article 40 of the Vienna Convention]
contain a much needed clarification of the relationships
between the various parties to an original treaty and a series of
amending agreements, particularly with regard to a state that
becomes a party to an amended treaty. In that case, the state,
unless it expresses a different intention, becomes both a party to
the treaty as amended and a party to the unamended treaty vis-
A-vis any party to the treaty not bound by the amendment.
169
This statement does not appear to be limited to the situation where a
new state adheres to the original treaty after an amending agreement comes
into force; instead, it seems to refer specifically to the scenario where a state
simultaneously becomes a party to the original treaty and to the amended
treaty by adhering solely to the amended version.
Another expert170 states without qualification that the unamended
treaty applies between a party to the treaty which does not become a party to
the amending agreement and a party to the amending agreement.17 ' While
this statement does not expressly include parties that adhere solely to the
amending agreement, it may be reasonably inferred that the statement was
intended as a categorical statement regarding all parties to the amending
agreement. In the case of a piecemeal list of revisions that depends on the
original treaty to provide the bulk of the text, such as the Hague Protocol,
the inference that the party should be bound by the original treaty is all the
more compelling. Thus, under the law of treaties as depicted by these
scholars, South Korea became a party to the unamended Warsaw
Convention with respect to the United States.
169 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 484.
170 Aust, a former Legal Adviser to the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, is a Legal
Counsellor at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London. AUST, supra note 90, at xvi.
171 AUST, supra note 90, at 220.
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c. The Second Circuit relied on a single commentator whose viewpoint
counters that of the majority
In Chubb, the court of appeals relied on the view expressed by
Frankowska, 172 who contends that Article 40(5) contemplates only the
situation where a new party accedes to the original treaty after an amending
agreement has entered into force. 173 Based on the premise that neither the
Vienna Convention drafters nor commentators contemplated the scenario
where a new party adheres solely to the amending agreement, 174 Frankowska
postulates that South Korea should not be bound by the original Warsaw
Convention, because "[u]nless it can be proven that a State consented to be
bound by an international obligation, the presumption that it is not bound
prevails.'
175
However, it is not certain that this is the meaning the drafters
intended. First, the International Bureaus for the Protection of Intellectual
and Industrial Property raised the problem in a statement made at the Vienna
Conference. 76 The representative raised the issue regarding the 1883 Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the 1886 Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 17 7 As in the
case of the Warsaw Convention, several amending agreements had been
made revising each of these treaties, but each revision was merely a different
version of the original treaty, which continued to exist. 78 The representative
stated:
A State, however, sometimes acceded to the most recent
[amending agreement], without declaring that its accession was
valid for the previous Acts. . . . In its relations with States
[parties to the treaty] but not parties to the most recent Act...
the acceding State was understood to have tacitly accepted all
the previous texts, so that its relations with the States parties
only to the earlier texts were governed by those earlier texts.
The legal position was arguable, but the system was the only
172 Maria Frankowska, an Associate Professor of Law at Southern Illinois University School of Law
at the time her article was published, had been a member of the Polish delegation to the Second Session of
the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties in 1969. Frankowska, supra note 67, at 281.
"' Id. at 364.
"4 Id. at 365.
175 Id. (emphasis in original).
176 See Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Sess. 31st mtg., statement by Woodley,
quoted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 469.
177 Id.
178 id.
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practicable one. The Union was more important than the
Convention which had set it up. Without that tacit acceptance
system, the State acceding to the latest text would have no
relations with half the membership of the Union. 1
79
Thus, a scenario highly analogous to the one at issue was brought to the
attention of the Vienna Conference. What action, if any, the Conference
determined to take with regard to this problem may be debated; however,
that the situation at issue was at least contemplated is undeniable.
Second, Frankowska's reasoning contradicts the effect of Article
40(5) that she bares out: Article 40(5) establishes the presumption that in
adhering to the original treaty after an amending agreement has come into
force, a state is "bound by the amending agreement, although it did not
expressly consent to such agreement."'' 80 Thus, the general rule that a state
is not bound unless it expressly consents to the terms' 8' is not absolute, and
in the scenario at issue the general rule may not necessarily govern.
Frankowska's reasoning equates a previously nonparty state that adheres to
the amending agreement to an original party that chooses not to ratify the
amending agreement. This logic is flawed. In the former scenario, the new
party chooses to accede to the amending agreement with full knowledge of
the contents of the previously existing underlying treaty, whereas in the
latter scenario the original party had agreed to the original treaty without any
knowledge of the yet-to-be-conceived amendments.
A more accurate analogy may be drawn between a new party that
accedes to the amending agreement and a new party that accedes to the
original treaty. In each case the newly adhering state presumably acts with
full knowledge of the original treaty and the amendments to it. In each of
these two scenarios the party's action may be viewed as ambiguous, since it
is not obvious whether the new party intends to be bound by only the
original treaty, by only the amending agreement, or by both; in contrast, the
inaction of a party to the original treaty in the face of a proposed amending
agreement admits of only one possible meaning-that the party does not
intend to be bound by the amendments. As a result, it may be reasonable to
infer that the members of the Vienna Conference determined that a new
party adhering either to the original treaty or to the amending agreement is
presumed to be bound by both.
179 Id.
18o Frankowska, supra note 67, at 365. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
'a' See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, even if the drafters or the members of the conference
had not contemplated the problem at issue in Chubb, and assuming for
argument that Article 40(5) did not address this situation, Frankowska's
conclusion does not necessarily follow. In this case, existing custom would
still govern. Given the practice observed with respect to the various
revisions to the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property and the 1886 Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works,' 82 there is a viable argument that customary international
law generally presumes a new party to an amending agreement to have
tacitly agreed to the existing treaty and previous amendments. If so, South
Korea should be presumed to have tacitly agreed to the original Warsaw
Convention, 8 3 placing it in treaty relations with the United States regarding
that treaty.
Third, given most scholars' construction of Articles XXI and XXIII of
the Hague Protocol,18 4 the meaning attributed to Article 40(5) of the Vienna
Convention may not govern the outcome regarding the Warsaw Convention,
because a specific provision of a treaty takes precedence over the provisions
of the Vienna Convention. 185 If Articles XXI and XXIII of the Hague
Protocol are given the construction suggested by most scholars, 8 6 then these
provisions override those of Article 40(5).
In any case, the general consensus of "the most highly qualified
publicists" has been that states adhering only to the Hague Protocol are in
treaty relations with states that are parties only to the original Warsaw
Convention.18 7 Thus, the weight of authority supports the opinion that South
Korea should be bound by the original treaty with regard to the United
States. Finally, in the introduction to her article, Frankowska candidly states
that "the article focuses primarily on what courts actually do instead of what
they should be doing."' 18 For these reasons, a more appropriate conclusion
may be that in adhering to the Hague Protocol South Korea did in fact enter
into treaty relations with the United States regarding the Warsaw
Convention.
182 See supra notes 177-176 and accompanying text.
183 For a discussion of the effect of subsequent practice of the parties, see supra Part IV.A.3.b.
184 See supra Part IV.A.4.a.
185 See Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 40, para. 1.
186 See supra Part IV.A.4.a.
187 See supra notes 157-171 and accompanying text.
188 Frankowska, supra note 67, at 281, 284.
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5. Policy Considerations Favor Finding Treaty Relations Between South
Korea and the United States
Regardless of whether the Warsaw Convention governs Chubb,
Asiana would potentially be exposed to unlimited liability. If Chubb were
denied a hearing in federal court, Chubb could nonetheless bring a cause of
action in state court, 189 where Asiana could be exposed to unlimited liability
under state law.' 90 Likewise, were the original Warsaw Convention strictly
applied, as this analysis would require, the federal court would retain subject
matter jurisdiction over the case, the treaty would provide the cause of
action, 19' and Asiana would face unlimited liability.' 92
In contrast, the rulings in the KAL cases served to limit the foreign
airline's liability. 193 Granted, the result advocated in this analysis would
have the opposite effect in Chubb. However, the court of appeals' decision,
far from limiting Asiana's liability, potentially exposes Asiana to unlimited
liability under state law, while at the same time depriving other air carriers
that operate between the United States and countries that adhere solely to the
Hague Protocol of all of the Warsaw Convention's protections-at least with
regard to air transport of cargo. The potential losses to U.S. and foreign air
carriers, especially if the Second Circuit's reasoning should be extended to
cases regarding passenger liability, would far outweigh any illusory benefit
in this case.
Admittedly, one of the main objectives of the Hague Protocol was to
eliminate the unnecessary air waybill particulars required by the Warsaw
Convention. 194 Thus, it may be argued that the virtue of the court of
appeals' decision is to be found in its avoidance of the application of the
"agreed stopping places" requirement. 95 Some will find that the application
189 See Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997).
190 See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., No. 00-7343, 2001 WL 403012, at *1-2, *4, *12
(2d Cir. April 20, 2001) (upholding the trial court's finding in an action grounded in breach of contract and
negligence that FedEx was liable to Fujitsu for damages of $726,640 for damage to silicon wafers during
air transportation where the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations did not apply because the air waybill
did not include "agreed stopping places.").
191 Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978). See infra note 229 and
accompanying text.]92 Asiana's liability for the lost cargo would not be limited under a strict application of the original
Warsaw Convention because Asiana did not comply with the "agreed stopping places" requirement. See
supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text; Tai Ping Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, 94 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir.
1996).
193 See supra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
194 Mankiewicz, supra note 61, at 79, 84; Calkins, supra note 42, at 259.
195 Failure to satisfy this requirement exposes the air carrier to unlimited liability. See supra notes
40-41 and accompanying text.
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of this arcane requirement would create an unfair result.' 96 However, the
facts of Chubb reveal that Asiana did not simply neglect to include the
"agreed stopping places" particular on the air waybill; instead, Asiana
changed the destination of the shipment to one which had not been agreed
between the parties. Application of the "agreed stopping places"
requirement, even with respect to an adherent of the Hague Protocol, would
not be nearly so egregious in these circumstances as in the case of a simple
air waybill error.
Furthermore, the objective of eliminating the Warsaw Convention's
unnecessarily detailed requirements was considered far inferior to the
primary objective of the Hague Protocol-increasing the liability limits for
passenger injury and death. 197 However, in a day when individual passenger
recovery resulting from an airline accident may reach $60 million,' 98 the
Hague Protocol's $16,600 limit on passenger recovery has become
insubstantially different from the Warsaw Convention's $8300 limit. Today,
the benefit derived from limiting air carrier liability to either amount
completely overshadows the significance of which limit is applied. No
outcome in Chubb could justify the potential avalanche in air carrier liability
that would result from extending the Second Circuit's reasoning to all
Warsaw Convention cases between the United States and countries that
adhere solely to the Hague Protocol. 199
Finally, any interpretation of the Hague Protocol should take into
account that it was intended to amend the Warsaw Convention.200 Thus, the
underlying object and purpose of the Hague Protocol is that of the Warsaw
Convention-uniformity in the application of the law governing
international air transport. 20  The interpretation suggested in this analysis
would further that goal; whereas, the court of appeals' construction of the
196 See MILLER, supra note 36, at 101. For example, New York state courts have rejected a strict
application of the "agreed stopping places" requirement. American Smelting and Refining Co. v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 4 Avi. 17,413, 17,414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (limiting Article 8(c) to cases where
the places of departure and destination do not themselves put the passenger or consignee on notice of the
international character of the flight).
197 Calkins, supra note 42, at 262.
118 James Wallace, US Airways Accuses Boeing: Says Data Withheld, Might Have Prevented Crash,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 18, 2000, at Al. Recoveries of greater the $10 million are not
unusual today. See, e.g., Byron Acohido, 737 Rudder Woes Known for Years Boeing Told FAA in Secret of
Hazard Before 1994 Crash, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 19, 2000, at A l.
'" Although the Second Circuit has suggested that the United States is now a party to the Hague
Protocol, see Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., No. 00-7343, 2001 WL 403012, at *6 (2d Cir. April 20,
2001), this conclusion is inconsistent with the court's reasoning in Chubb. See supra note 62.
200 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 47, at 504-05.
201 Id. at 498; JEAN-LOuiS MAGDELtNAT, AIR CARGO: REGULATION AND CLAIMS 129 (1983).
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Hague Protocol would instead further segregate the already severely
fragmented liability scheme of the Warsaw System.
202
B. The District Court Had Federal Question Jurisdiction over Chubb
Regardless of Whether Treaty Relations Existed Between South Korea
and the United States
After deciding that treaty relations did not exist between the United
States and South Korea, the court of appeals for the Second Circuit held that
this deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. 203
Nevertheless, an analysis of the case reveals that federal question subject
matter jurisdiction did not depend on the outcome of the treaty question,
because the treaty question itself-whether or not treaty relations existed
under the circumstances in Chubb-presented a federal question sufficient to
confer subject matter jurisdiction over the case upon the lower federal
courts. Thus, even in the absence of treaty relations between the two
countries, the court had jurisdiction-which included the discretion to hear
any related claims.
1. The District Court Had Jurisdiction in Chubb Independent of the
Outcome of the Treaty Question
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction: "The validity of an
order of a federal court depends upon that court's having jurisdiction over
both the subject matter and the parties.,,204 A federal court can only exercise
subject matter jurisdiction if both the U.S. Constitution and federal
legislation authorize such jurisdiction. 205 Not only is subject matter
jurisdiction required, but also federal courts are required to raise the lack of
206
subject matter jurisdiction on their own motion. 6 Unlike personal
202 See MAGDELtNAT, supra note 201, at 129 ("The original intention of the Warsaw Convention, as
stated in its title, was to 'unify certain rules' relating to international carriage by air. Today, this is far from
being the case. ... [T]he problems arising out of the Warsaw Convention are viewed differently in the
various legal systems, thus jeopardizing its very purpose of unification."). Extending the Second Circuit's
reasoning to other Warsaw Convention amending agreements further propagates this fragmentation. See
supra notes 62, 199.
203 Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 314 (2d Cir. 2000).
204 Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982).
205 Verlinden BV v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983); Ins. Corp. ofIreland, 456 U.S.
at 701.
206 Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977); see also Ins. Corp. of
Ireland, 456 U.S. at 701-02; Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
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jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties'
consent.2°7
The Constitution provides for federal question, or "arising under,"
jurisdiction over "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under th[e]
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made or which
shall be made, under their Authority. 20 8 Treaty jurisdiction is a category of
federal question jurisdiction. In 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Congress has provided
that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 209
Furthermore, under the Constitution, treaties are considered a part of the
"supreme Law of the Land., 2 °10 Thus, U.S. courts have held that claims
arising under U.S. treaties are within the federal question jurisdiction of both
Article III and § 133 1.211 Treaties enjoy essentially the same status in U.S.
212courts as federal statutes. Thus, treaties create enforceable rights and
preempt inconsistent state law.213
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that this status applies to
international law generally: "International law is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination., 21 4 Thus, issues concerning customary
international law also fall under federal question jurisdiction.
a. An allegation that a treaty creates a cause of action is a federal
question
Whether a case arises under federal law within the meaning of § 1331
is decided by applying the "well-pleaded complaint" rule: "[W]hether a case
is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States,
in the sense of the jurisdictional statute ... must be determined from what
necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or
207 Ins. Corp. ofIreland, 456 U.S. at 702.
208 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
209 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
210 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Abramson v. Japan Airlines, 587 F. Supp. 1099, 1102 (D.C. N.J. 1983).
211 See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.
1991); Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.
1984); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978).
212 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 (1987).
213 See U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937); Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc., 737
F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1984).
214 Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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declaration. ... ,,215 Defenses claimed in the defendant's answer, or the
plaintiff's anticipation in the complaint of those defenses, are not relevant to
the analysis .216 Therefore, based solely on the plaintiffs well-pleaded
complaint, the court determines whether the suit arises under federal law.217
The statutory "arising under" clause in § 1331 has been more
narrowly construed than the corresponding constitutional clause. 218  The
basic rule, as explained in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,
is that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action. 21 9
Thus, the cause of action generally must have its basis in federal law.
However, the application of this rule has not been entirely rigid.22 °
For example, in Bell v. Hood,22 ! the Supreme Court held that the
lower court had jurisdiction because the outcome depended on an
interpretation of federal statutes and the Constitution. The Court
explained that the district court had jurisdiction because the right of the
petitioners to recover under their complaint would be sustained if the
Constitution and laws of the United States were given one construction and
223defeated if they were given another. Two of the justices dissented in Bell,
asserting that whether the complaint states a cause of action arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States "is for the court, not the
pleader, to say. 224 Nevertheless, the dissent agreed with the majority that
when federal law affords a remedy which may in some circumstances be
availed of by a plaintiff, "the fact that his pleading does not bring him within
that class as one entitled to the remedy, goes to the sufficiency of the
pleading and not to the jurisdiction. ,2 25
Thus, although a lawsuit may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if
the alleged federal claim "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely
for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly
215 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (quoting
Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)).
216 See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (dismissing the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which had been asserted in anticipation of a federal defense to the
plaintiff's nonfederal cause of action).
217 Verlinden BV v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494 (1983).
218 id.
219 Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
220 Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 9 (1983).
221 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
222 Id. at 685; see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1,
27-28 (1983).
223 Bell, 327 U.S. at 685.
224 Id.
225 Id.
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insubstantial and frivolous, 226 as long as the plaintiff has a good faith
reason to believe that federal law may apply, jurisdiction is sufficiently
established by an allegation of a claim under federal law.227 In accordance
with United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, once subject matter
jurisdiction has been established, even if the federal claim is subsequently
dismissed as not being one upon which relief can be granted, lower federal
courts nevertheless have discretion to retain jurisdiction over related claims,
whether based on federal or state law.
228
b. Treaty jurisdiction should have attached in Chubb, because the
plaintiff's complaint asserted a substantial, nonfrivolous cause of
action under a valid treaty of the United States
If a treaty relationship existed between South Korea and the United
States, the dispute in Chubb fell squarely within federal question subject
matter jurisdiction. The Second Circuit has explicitly held that the Warsaw
Convention creates a cause of action. 229 Therefore, a case brought under the
Warsaw Convention meets the American Well Works test for "arising under"
federal law. Thus, if the treaty applied to international air transport between
South Korea and the United States, the cause of action in Chubb arose under
the Warsaw Convention, and since a U.S. treaty is federal law, the suit arose
under federal law and federal question subject matter jurisdiction attached.
Furthermore, even if, as the court of appeals concluded, no treaty
relationship existed, Chubb, like Bell, nonetheless is within the
constitutional and statutory jurisdictional limits of federal questions. Even
though Chubb may not have met the strict American Well Works test,
230
Chubb's right to relief under the claims on the face of its complaint required
interpretation of a U.S. treaty, in order to determine whether a treaty
relationship existed between South Korea and the United States. Since U.S.
treaties, as well as customary international law, are part of federal law, by
analogy to Bell, Chubb included a question of federal law.
226 Id. at 682-83.
227 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
22' 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (holding
that federal courts have discretion to hear supplemental state law claims even after all federal claims have
been dismissed, as long as the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact").
229 Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978). The Warsaw
Convention is a self-executing treaty; i.e., no domestic legislation is required to give it the force of law.
TWA v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984).
230 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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Chubb's claim under the Warsaw Convention was neither
insubstantial nor frivolous. In light of the numerous cases that had
previously been adjudicated in federal courts under treaty jurisdiction based
on the Warsaw Convention treaty relationship between the United States and
South Korea, Chubb had a strong "good faith reason" to believe that the
treaty would apply to the dispute. Chubb's basis for alleging a claim under
the Warsaw Convention easily met the test of not being "wholly
insubstantial and frivolous." There was no indication that Chubb made the
claim solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction. On the contrary, both
parties initially believed that the Warsaw Convention governed the dispute.
As in Bell, Chubb's right to recover under their complaint would be
sustained if a treaty of the United States were given one construction231 and
232defeated if it were given another construction. In this case, the fact that
Chubb's pleading did not bring it within that class as one entitled to the
remedy goes to the sufficiency of the pleading and not to the jurisdiction.
Therefore, if the Warsaw Convention was not applicable to international air
transport between South Korea and the United States, the court of appeals
was entitled only to dismiss the claim as not being one upon which relief can
be granted.
Nonetheless, even if the Warsaw Convention claim were dismissed,
under Gibbs the district court probably had discretion to retain jurisdiction
over related claims, whether based on federal or state law. Therefore, the
district court had the authority to exercise federal question jurisdiction over
Chubb even if, as the court of appeals held, there was no treaty relationship
between South Korea and the United States.
2. Policy Considerations
In drafting the Constitution, one of the framers' central concerns was
to ensure that the federal government would enjoy broad control over
foreign affairs and trade.233 Regarding federal court jurisdiction, Alexander
Hamilton stated that because "the denial or perversion of justice by the
sentences of courts ... is with reason classed among the just causes of war,
it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned., 234 Thus, the
231 That is, that a treaty relationship existed.
232 That is, there was no treaty relationship.
233 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 10 (3d ed. 1996).
234 ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 80 at 476 (New Am. Library ed.
1961); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, para. (a)(2) (1994) (providing for "alienage" jurisdiction over civil actions
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framers of the Constitution determined that the nation's interests would best
be served if cases involving foreign affairs and trade were heard in federal
235
court. The Supreme Court has reiterated this sentiment, pointing out that
the Federalist Papers demonstrate the "importance of national power in all
matters relating to foreign affairs and the inherent danger of state action in
this field. 236
In stark contrast, the Second Circuit's holding in Chubb would
discourage plaintiffs from bringing cases with claims under international law
in federal court. Chubb sends a clear message: short of an explicit holding
directly on point from the U.S. Supreme Court, plaintiffs with claims under
international law are likely to be forced to refile their disputes in state court
after expending considerable time and resources in federal court. The
resulting incentive is to bring cases that include uncertain claims based on
international law in state court. As a result plaintiffs will be induced to bring
the cases that are most likely to determine the future boundaries of
international law in state court, rather than in federal court.
V. CONCLUSION
A thorough review of the customary international law as it applies to
treaty interpretation and the amendment of multilateral treaties demonstrates
that at the time of the Chubb shipment, treaty relations under the Warsaw
Convention likely existed between the United States, which adhered only to
the original treaty, and South Korea, which adhered only to an amending
agreement, the Hague Protocol. In addition, a review of U.S. jurisdictional
law indicates that, independent of the outcome of the treaty question, the
lower federal courts were vested with federal question subject matter
jurisdiction over Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines. Therefore, to the
extent that the Second Circuit deviated from this result, the court of appeals'
holding in Chubb was incorrect.
Articles 31 and 32, taken together with Article 40(5) of the Vienna
Convention, suggest that customary international law may bind parties
adhering only to an amending agreement with respect to parties adhering
only to the original treaty. Moreover, taking subsequent practice into
account, South Korea's acquiescence to the U.S. courts' exercise of
between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state"). It should be noted that because
one party in Chubb was a U.S. citizen and the other was a foreign citizen, alienage jurisdiction also
attached in this case, independent of the presence of a federal question.
235 See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
236 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1941).
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jurisdiction over earlier cases with claims under the Warsaw Convention
supports the conclusion that South Korea implicitly consented to the terms
of the original Warsaw Convention with respect to the United States.
Furthermore, most scholars have agreed that, at least with regard to
the Hague Protocol, adherence to an amending agreement binds a new party
to the terms of the original treaty with respect to parties that adhere solely to
that treaty. Finally, policy considerations regarding the application of the
Warsaw Convention and its progeny favor the presumption that parties
adhering to the Hague Protocol without expressly rejecting the Warsaw
Convention should be bound to the terms of the original Warsaw Convention
with respect to parties that adhere solely to the original treaty.
For these reasons, the court should have found that South Korea was
in a treaty relationship with the United States, and therefore should have
decided Chubb under the original Warsaw Convention. Notwithstanding
this conclusion, given the demonstrated ambiguity of Article 40(5) of the
Vienna Convention, and the resulting uncertainty regarding the outcome in
the factual scenario presented in Chubb, the international legal community
would be well-advised to revisit this issue-the effect of a new party to a
treaty adhering only to an amending agreement-and provide an explicit and
nuanced resolution.
Moreover, application of the principles delineated in Supreme Court
opinions to Chubb compels the conclusion that the lower federal courts were
authorized to exercise jurisdiction over this case. Even assuming that treaty
relations did not exist between South Korea and the United States, the
plaintiff had nonetheless alleged a substantial, nonfrivolous claim under the
Warsaw Convention that required the construction of customary
international law and a treaty of the United States. Since the outcome in
Chubb depended on an interpretation of international law, federal question
jurisdiction attached. This being the case, the district court had the
discretion to hear other claims, whether based on federal or state law, even
after the claims under the Warsaw Convention were dismissed.
Quite apart from the influence that these issues of treaty law and
subject matter jurisdiction may have on the outcome of Chubb, the
consequences of the Second Circuit's construction of the customary
international law of treaties, and its application of the domestic jurisdictional
law may have far-reaching effects. All multilateral treaties, once amended,
fall prey to the court of appeals' reasoning. The predictable result threatens
the significant progress that has been achieved in the area of international
legislation during the past century. Equally disconcerting, as a result of this
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opinion the construction of international law may increasingly transpire in
state rather than federal court.
